

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 02672 01 OF 03 140835Z

15

ACTION ACDA-10

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 2672

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: LINK BETWEEN PHASES

REF: STATE 103600

1. INTERNATIONAL STAFF HAS PREPARED SECOND REVISION OF C-M(74)30, INTEGRATING INTO ONE DOCUMENT PREVIOUS NAC GUIDANCE ON THE LINK BETWEEN PHASES. IS PREPARED THIS AS AN AID TO ANY SPC DISCUSSION OF NEW GUIDANCE TO AHG ON PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN PHASES. NO COUNTRY HAS YET MADE PROPOSALS FOR NEW GUIDANCE ON LATTER SUBJECT, AND WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE IT WILL RETURN TO SPC AGENDA UNTIL THERE IS A NATIONAL PROPOSAL.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF C-(74)30 (2ND REVISION):

THE LINK BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES
OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS(1)
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02672 01 OF 03 140835Z

I. INTRODUCTION

(A) BASIC CONCEPTS

(I) THE CONCEPT OF A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS IS CONTAINED IN C-M(73)83(FINAL), PARAGRAPHS 34, WHICH STATES IN PART:

"THE ALLIES WILL NEGOTIATE FOR INCLUSION ON A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT OF LANGUAGE PROVIDING FOR A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR AGREEMENT TO THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON MANPOWER CEILING FOR NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA... THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE SECOND PHASE ... ALTHOUGH ALLIED DECISIONS ON THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR FURTHER EXAMINATION AND REFLECTION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, THIS SECOND PHASE SHOULD ON THE WESTERN SIDE FOCUS ON REDUCTIONS OF NON-US NATO FORCES ..."

(II) THE CONCEPT OF A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME IS SET OUT IN AGV(74)3, OF 24TH JANUARY, 1974, PARAGRAPH 5, WHICH SAYS IN PART:

"THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES ... COULD STATE THEIR VIEW THAT SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS COULD START "WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE ONE AGREEMENT BASED ON ALLIED PROPOSALS, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT."

THE AD HOC GROUP, IN ITS 5TH APRIL REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, STATED THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE TOLD THE EAST THAT THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME FROM THE "ENTRY INTO FORCE" OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02672 01 OF 03 140835Z

(1) THE TERM "PHASE", AS USED HERE, HAS THE AGREED C-M(73)83(FINAL) MEANING OF "A MAJOR NEGOTIATING PERIOD RESULTING IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT (E.G. THE FIRST PHASE WITH REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US FORCES)".

(B) CENTRAL OBJECTIVES

IN THE NEXT MBFR NEGOTIATING SESSION, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE OBJECTIVE OF GETTING THE EAST TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATION IN A FIRST PHASE OF ONLY US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND TO DEFER REDUCTIONS OF

OTHER NATO FORCES TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD CONTINUE TO

EMPHASIZE THE COMMON CEILING AS THE BASIS FOR THE
OVERALL ALLIED APPROACH AND A CENTRAL OBJECTIVE.

TO ACHIEVE THE FOREGOING OBJECTIVES, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS
ARE AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED AS OUTLINED IN SECTIONS II-V
BELOW, IF AND AS JUSTIFIED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
TACTICAL NEGOTIATING SITUATION; ALL POINTS WOULD BE
CONTINGENT OF REACHING A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE
AGREEMENT, INCLUDING COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING
CONCEPT.

IN ORALLY INDICATING TO THE EAST THEIR WILLINGNESS
TO TAKE THESE STEPS, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD USE
GENERAL LANGUAGE IN DRAWING ON THE INSTRUCTIONS BELOW.
WHILE KEEPING IN MIND CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THIS
INSTRUCTION, AND AVOIDING STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD
CONFLICT WITH THEM, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD POSTPONE
SPECIFIC FORMULATIONS UNTIL ACTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS JUSTIFIES SUCH ACTION. THE AD HOC GROUP
SHOULD DETERMINE THE TACTICS AND SEQUENCE OF
PRESENTATION TO THE EAST OF THE ITEMS BELOW.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 02672 02 OF 03 140859Z

12

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 2672

II. THE FIXING OF THE PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES

WITH RESPECT TO PREVIOUS ALLIED INDICATIONS THAT THE
FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN A PROVISION THAT SECOND PHASE
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN WITHIN AN AGREED FIXED PERIOD OF TIME

AFTER THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD TELL THE EAST THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE DURATION OF THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE CONCLUSION OF FIRST PHASE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS. DEPENDING UPON THE PROGRESS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, THE ALLIES WOULD IN DUE COURSE BE PREPARED TO INDICATE THAT THEY WOULD EXPECT SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN AS SOON AFTER FIRST PHASE SIGNATURE AS IS PRACTICABLE, WHICH WOULD NOT BE LATER THAN IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST PHASE WITHDRAWALS. IF THE NEGOTIATORS FIND IT NECESSARY IN THE LIGHT OF THE TACTICAL NEGOTIATING SITUATION, THEY COULD INDICATE THAT THEIR PRELIMINARY ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE PERIOD REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THESE WITHDRAWALS SHOULD NOT BE LONGER THAN 18 MONTHS(1).

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02672 02 OF 03 140859Z

FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE AD HOC GROUP ONLY, PERFORMANCE ON THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD BE A FACTOR BOTH IN THE DETERMINING THE CONDUCT OF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS AND IN INFLUENCING THEIR SATISFACTORY OUTCOME.

KII. NON-INCREASE OF FORCES COMMITMENT

TO MEET EASTERN CONCERNS THAT WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT INCREASE THEIR FORCES BETWEEN PHASES TO COMPENSATE FOR US WITHDRAWALS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF WESTERN FIRST PHASE PROPOSALS, WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS A NON-INCREASE OF FORCES COMMITMENT BINDING THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND APPLYING BETWEEN A FIRST PHASE AND A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT. THE MATERIAL IN PARENTHESES BELOW IS FOR THE INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE OF THE AD HOC GROUP ONLY, AND NOT FOR USE WITH THE OTHER SIDE AT THIS TIME.

SPECIFICS OF THE COMMITMENT

(A) THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON EACH SIDE WOULD AGREE THAT THE OVERALL AGGREGATE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER (PERMANENTLY STATIONED) IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE INCREASED BEYOND THE LEVEL EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES ESTABLISHED IN THAT AGREEMENT. (THE COMMITMENT SHOULD BE FORMULATED IN SUCH A WAY THAT NO NATIONAL OR COLLECTIVE SUB-CEILINGS ON NON-US NATO FORCES ARE CREATED. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO INCLUDE EQUIPMENT OF ANY KIND IN THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD OF COURSE PROHIBIT THE SOVIETS FROM TRANSFERRING THEIR TANKS TO POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA OR THE GDR, SINCE THE ALLIED POSITION CALLS FOR WITH-

(1) FOR INFORMATION OF AD HOC GROUP ONLY:

THE ALLIES RECOGNISE THAT THE INDICATION OF THE PERIOD OF TIME IS QUALIFIED BY THE PHRASES "AS SOON AS INS PRACTICABLE "PRELIMINARY ASSUMPTION" AND "SHOULD NOT BE LONGER". OTHER
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02672 02 OF 03 140859Z

FACTORS THAN THE TIME NEEDED FOR FIRST PHASE WITHDRAWALS MIGHT HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED.

THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WITHDRAWALS WOULD BEGIN UPON SIGNATURE OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT OR ONLY UPON RATIFICATION CANNOT BE ANSWERED AT THIS STAGE.

DRAWAL OF THE TANKS TO THE SOVIET HOMELAND. THE POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF SOVIET TANKS TO WARSAW, PACT ALLIES OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE PROHIBITED, E.G. IN NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS.)

(B) THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD COME INTO FORCE ONLY UPON CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, (IN ACCORDANCE WITH C-M(73)83(FINAL)) INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

(C) THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE CLEARLY PRESENTED TO THE OTHER SIDE AS A MEANS OF LININNG THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES. (THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD DO NOTHING TO PRE-JUDGE THE FORM OF THE COMMITMENT. THE ALLIANCE WOULD STUDY WHICH FORM SUCH A COMMITMENT WOULD TAKE. E.G. A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION IN THE FIRST PHASE

AGREEMENT ITSELF, A JOINT EAST-WEST DECLARATION MADE ON OR SHOURTLY AFTER THE DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, SEPARATE OR COLLECTIVE DELCARATIONS OF INTENT BY BOTH SIDES MADE ON OR SHORTLY AFTER THE DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, OR THE RECORD OF A PRENARY MEETING SHOWING THAT A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE WESTERN SIDE AND ONE FROM THE EASTERN SIDE HAD MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS AGREEING TO THE COMMITMENT.)

(D) THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BECOME INVALID IF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED OR IF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BROKEN OFF. A SATISFACTORY SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT, WHEN CONCLUDED, WOULD AUTOMATICALLY SUPERSEDE THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 02672 03 OF 03 140922Z

11

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 DODEA-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 2672

(E) IN ANY EVENT, THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE LIMITED IN DURATION TO A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD(1). (THE MAXIMUM PERIOD COULD BE EXTENDED BY MUTUAL CONSENT OF THE TWO SIDES. SUCH MUTUAL CONSENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AND SHOWED REASONABLE PROMISE OF A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION.)

(F) THE COMMITMENT SHOULD CONTAIN EXCEPTIONS TO ALLOW FOR NORMAL EXERCISES AND ROTATIONS(2). (THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT SHOULD BE SO FORMULATED THAT IT WOULD IN NO WAY RESTRICT QUALITATIVE FORCE IMPROVEMENTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE OR OTHERWISE HINDER DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.)

(1) THE EFFECT OF THIS IS TO MAKE THE DURATION OF THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT AND OF THE REVIEW PERIOD CO-TERMINOUS

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02672 03 OF 03 140922Z

(2) (THE EXACT NATURE OF THESE EXCEPTIONS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF TECHNICAL STUDY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.)

(G) (THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE NON-INCREASE OFFER TO THE EASTERN SIDE IS MADE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF HUNGARY IN MBFR AGREEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, IN NEGOTIATING A NON-

INCREASE COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE LEVEL OF SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY CAN BE COVERED BY A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE IN THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT.)

IV. ASSURANCES TO OTHER SIDE REGARDING SECOND PHASE

WITH REGARD TO EASTERN QUESTIONS WHETHER ALL NON-US ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIES WOULD TELL THE EAST THAT, IN THE EVENT OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A COMMITMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE THE PRACTICAL EFFECT THAT THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS TO THE AGREED OVERALL COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES PERSONNEL OF EACH SIDE WOULD INCLUDE REDUCTIONS IN THE GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS OF ALL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD DO NOTHING TO PREJUDICE THE AGREED ALLIED CONCEPT OF SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 11 AND 34 OF C-M(73(83(FINAL), OR THE POSITION YET TO BE TAKEN ON THE EXACT NATURE OF A COMMITMENT.

THE ALLIES, IN COMMUNICATING THE ABOVE TO THE OTHER SIDE, WILL DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE EASTERN COUNTRIES TO THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES APPLYING TO LUXEMBOURG, WHICH PREVENT IT FROM REDUCING ITS FORCES FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

(A) LUXEMBOURG IS TAKING PART IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FOR GEOGRAPHICAL REASONS: IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR LUXEMBOURG TO CONSTITUTE A "SANCTUARY", EVEN IN THEORY, IN THE HEART OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

(B) AS LUXEMBOURG HAS STATED FROM THE OUTSET, IT CANNOT REDUCE ITS FORCES AND STILL ENSURE MINIMUM DEFENCE
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02672 03 OF 03 140922Z

OF ITS TERRITORY AND A MINIMUM CONTRIBUTION TO NATO. MOREOVER, POLICE, GENDARMERIE AND CUSTOMS UNITS ARE RECRUITED FROM THESE FORCES.

(C) THE QUANTITATIVE ASPECT OF THE LUXEMBOURG FORCES PROBLEM IS OF NEGLIGIBLE IMPORTANCE. THE EXPLANATION OF LUXEMBOURG'S POSITION, AND ITS ACCEPTANCE BY THE EASTERN COUNTRIES, SHOULD BE EASY. SHOULD THE EASTERN COUNTRIES WISH THIS ACCEPTANCE TO APPEAR AS A CONCESSION, ALBEIT MINOR, ON THEIR PART, THIS COULD ONLY BE INTERPRETED AS LACK OF INTEREST IN ACHIEVING RAPID RESULTS IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

V. REVIEW PROCEDURE (1)

IF AND WHEN NEEDED, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS COULD AGREE THAT THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT CONTAIN A PROVISION STIPULATING THAT, FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE SIGNATURE OF THE FIRST PHASE

AGREEMENT, THE TWO SIDES WOULD CONSIDER THE EXTENT TO WHICH
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SATISFACTORY AND
EXAMINE THE RESULTS OF SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS. THE
PARTICIPANTS WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO DRAW THE APPROPRIATE

(1) (SOME DELEGATIONS FELT THAT WITHDRAWAL/REVIEW PROVISION
SHOULD BE ELABORATED NOT IN THE LINK CONTEXT BUT IN RESPONSE
TO THE REQUIREMENT IN PARAGRAPH 73 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL) FOR
A GENERAL WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.)

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